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By Dr Simon Duke  Dr Simon Duke  Dr Simon Duke  Dr Simon Duke  Dr Simon Duke*
The EU’s competences in external relations are shared
between the European Community and the more inter-
governmental ‘pillars’ on which the Union rests. This is most
obvious in the case of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP – the so-called ‘second pillar’), although
external relations also involves an increasingly important
collection of border, organised crime and counter-terrorism
issues that arise in the context of the ‘third pillar’ of Police
and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. Moreover,
the demise of the cold war and the rapid growth of CFSP
and its subset, the European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP), have led to some tensions in the ‘grey areas’ that
fall in-between the Community and CFSP. The purpose of
this contribution is to examine the nature and extent of these
tensions and to consider various approaches to resolving,
or at least diminishing, them.
The intention is not to offer a comprehensive legal
analysis of competences in external relations, since many
exist, but to consider the issue from a more political and
policy-oriented perspective. Since the scope of the subject
still remains broad, it is therefore hoped that the use of a
case study, that of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW),
will help to illustrate some of the more general issues.
Areas of grey in EU external relations
Historically there is evidence of at least concern, if not
tension, between the predominant Community aspects of
external relations and the European Political Cooperation
(EPC) process that emerged in 1970. By design EPC was
intended to be ‘distinct from and additional to the activities
of the Community’.1  The sense of ‘otherness’ would have
longer-term consequences since it implied that the com-
petences of EPC and its successor, CFSP, would be framed
in a ‘distinct’ manner and, to some, as an appendage to the
Community. The October 1981 London summit referred to
the importance attached by the Ten to ‘the Commission of
the European Communities being fully associated with
political cooperation, at all levels’.2 Later, the Single
European Act of 1986 noted that external policies were to
be ‘consistent’ and the Presidency and the Commission
were given ‘special responsibility’ in this regard.3  However,
in a curious formulation, the preamble stressed the impor-
tance of Europe ‘speaking increasingly with one voice and
to act with consistency and solidarity in order more effectively
to protect its common interest and independence’, but also
that the Member States ‘may make their own contribution
to the preservation of peace and security…’. The juxtaposition
between ‘one voice’ and ‘own contribution’ not only points
backwards, to the ‘otherness’ of EPC, but also hints at the
future difficulties that would be encountered in achieving a
‘voice’ in external relations.
The end of the Cold War and the Maastricht Treaty saw
EPC incorporated into the Treaty on European Union (TEU)
as CFSP, or the second pillar. The former EPC ministerial
meetings were replaced by meetings of the Foreign Ministers
meeting as the General Affairs Council (and, from 2002
onwards, as the General Affairs and External Relations
Council). CFSP remained distinct in terms of its decision-
making procedures and the respective rights accorded to
the Member States and the Community. The TEU was
attentive to the need for the Union to ‘ensure the consistency
of its external activities as a whole in the context of its
external relations, security, economic and development
policies’.4  The Council and the Commission, in the context
of the Union’s single institutional framework, were given
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The EU’s competences in external relations are shared between the European
Community and the more intergovernmental ‘pillars’ on which the Union rests.
This is most obvious in the case of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP
– the so-called ‘second pillar’). Moreover, the demise of the cold war and the rapid
growth of CFSP and its subset, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),
have led to some tensions in the ‘grey areas’ that fall in-between the Community
and CFSP . The purpose of this contribution is to examine the nature and extent of
these tensions and to consider various approaches to resolving, or at least
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responsibility for consistency and were required to ‘ensure
the implementation of these policies, each in accordance
with its respective powers’.
The Community, which has legal personality, derives its
competences in external relations from two sources. First,
there are express powers specifically bestowed upon the
Community by the Treaty establishing the European
Community (TEC), such as Article 300 which gives the
Community the power to enter into international agreements.
Other prominent examples would be Article 133 (addressing
the common commercial policy) and Article 310 (concerning
association agreements). The Community’s external powers
also include a number of other significant areas such as
environmental policy (which specifically mentions the
‘international level’ and ‘worldwide environmental pro-
blems’ as part of the Community remit) and education and
vocational concerns where the Community will ‘foster
cooperation with third countries’. Second, competences in
external relations may also be implied, meaning that they
derive from the internal competences laid out in Article 3
TEC.5  The Court has, over the years, shaped and extended
the competences of the Community in external relations,
most notably in the Kramer case where the authority to enter
into international commit-
ments could arise ‘not only
from an express attribution
by the Treaty, but equally
may flow implicitly from its
provisions’.6
The advent of CFSP
posed immediate ques-
tions of competence. For
example, the common
commercial policy in the
TEC had not hitherto been
particularly contentious,
but it now raised implicit
questions of how it relates
to foreign policy. Similar
issues arose with regard
to development policy (which is one of the reasons that the
Commission dislikes the notion of ‘political conditionality’
being ascribed to its external assistance programmes).
From the outset the TEU gave rise, as we shall see below,
to questions of hierarchy between the Community areas
and Title V (CFSP).
The questions of competence and hierarchy were exacer-
bated by differences within the Commission itself, with no
less than four Directorates-General (DGs) being responsible
for external relations and development. The inevitable
competition that resulted between the DGs and their
respective Commissioners may, in part, account for the
difficulties encountered in defining the Community’s profile
in EU external relations and in shaping the substance of its
‘full association’ with CFSP. Differences in bureaucratic
culture and the size and composition of the EU institutions
have also played a role in competences issues which is
commonly under-estimated. The lighter structures within
the Council General Secretariat and the more political role
of Directorate-General E in particular, have allowed for
more institutional adaptation and the assumption of tasks
in the grey areas. The appointment of the High Representative
for CFSP in October 1999, as well as the establishment of
a Policy Unit which reports to him and, soon thereafter, the
military and civilian crisis management institutions in the
ESDP area, have had a notable impact on the ascendancy
of the Council in external relations.
Before embarking upon a more detailed look at the
specific case of SALW, it is important to provide a sense of
the extent to which differences or tensions exist in the so-
called grey areas. This will hopefully provide useful context
for the case study.
Shades of grey in EU external relations
There were some areas where the potential for overlap was
clearly foreseen and provision was therefore made for this
in the Treaties. The most obvious example of this nature is
the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of
‘economic relations with one or more third countries’
[Article 301 TEC]. In this instance the Council ‘shall take the
necessary urgent measures’ and shall act by ‘a qualified
majority on a proposal from the Commission’. Hence, in
this particular instance the Council adopts the necessary
political decision to enforce economic sanctions while the
Commission oversees the implementation. The relationship
between the two institutions is also clearly laid out in this
instance and the emphasis is very much upon the primacy
of the Council.
An associated area
where there is close col-
laboration between the
Commission and the
Council is in the respect
for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, which
is mentioned in both the
TEC and the TEU. The
Commission routinely
integrates human rights
provisions (often referred
to as an ‘essential ele-
ments’ clause) into its
agreements with external
partners, with stipulations
for penalties in the event of non-compliance. One of the
results of partial or total non-compliance can be the
suspension of economic relations (as was the case in
Liberia, Niger, Togo and Zimbabwe, to name but a few) in
the manner outlined above.
Both of the above are examples of overlapping compe-
tences that were identified by the Treaties and provision was
made for a consistent and coherent approach. They are
also, however, rather predictable cases; other issues such
as election monitoring, dual-use goods, defence industrial
aspects, conflict prevention, civilian crisis management,
SALW and issues of external representation pose more
complex challenges, with less clear-cut responses.
Commission challenges to the Council have been moun-
ted on a number of occasions for allegedly infringing upon
Community competences in external relations. Common
positions adopted in 1994 on Rwanda and the Ukraine
were both criticised for the inclusion of Community matters
in CFSP ‘common positions’. Similar examples have been
cited of the ‘overly pervasive’ use of CFSP instruments in the
cases of electoral observation in Russia and South Africa as
well as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organi-
zation initiative.7 Other issue areas, cutting across a number
of countries, such as the export of dual-use goods have also
frequently surfaced as points of contention between the
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The potential for clashes
over issues of competence
has doubtlessly been
fuelled by the multifarious
challenges facing the EU in
its external relations and, in
particular, the rapid growth
of crisis management.E
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Community and the second pillar. Conversely, the Council
has challenged the Commission’s competence to act when
it supported conflict-prevention programmes in West Africa
(through  The Southern Africa Development Community
and the Economic Community of West African States) as
well as in Nepal; supported peace-building and mediation
in Aceh, Liberia and Sudan; promoted peace-building
efforts in Bolivia; and support for UN good offices in
Colombia.8  In a similar vein there are also dimensions of
Security Sector Reform (SSR) that have military or (external)
police dimensions which fall within the CFSP competence.
The potential for clashes over issues of competence has
doubtlessly been fuelled by the multifarious challenges
facing the EU in its external relations and, in particular, the
rapid growth of crisis management. These challenges, as
the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, observed
in his European Security Strategy, call upon the Union to
‘bring together the different instruments and capabilities:
European assistance programmes and the European
Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from
Member States and other instruments … Security is the first
condition for development’.9 Although undoubtedly correct,
the issue still remains of how to combine the instruments
and capabilities. The manner in which the strategy was
drafted, primarily within the Council Secretariat and with
little consultation with the
Commission, is symptoma-
tic of the issue. Chris Patten
has already noted that the
growth of CFSP and its
associated structures de-
pended upon finding a
modus vivendi with the
Community. The following
reflections by Patten, made
in 2000, are worth quoting
with this in mind:
The important point is
that – however awkward they may be – the new structures,
procedures and instruments of CFSP recognise the need
to harness the strengths of the European Community in
the service of European foreign policy. That is why the
Treaty ‘fully associates’ the European Commission with
CFSP. We participate fully in the decision-making process
in the Council, with a shared right of initiative which we
shall exercise. Our role cannot be reduced to one of
‘painting by numbers’ – simply filling in the blanks on a
canvas drawn by others. Nor should it be. It would be
absurd to divorce European foreign policy from the
institutions which have been given responsibility for most
of the instruments for its accomplishment: for external
trade questions, including sanctions; for European external
assistance; for many of the external aspects of Justice and
Home Affairs.10
Issues of foreign policy are one factor, but perhaps of more
importance is the rapidly emerging ESDP with its various crisis-
management roles; it has already been observed that some
of the most sensitive competence issues have arisen in and
around this area. From a legal perspective it is ‘the aim and
content of an envisaged operation’ that determines the legal
basis.11 This therefore suggests that an operation is either a
Community instrument, financed through the Community
budget; a CFSP operation (without military or defence impli-
cations) financed through the CFSP budget; or, an ESDP
operation which falls outside the Community budget.12
The competence issue, though, is only partially a legal
matter. The question of funding also influences competence
issues between the pillars. Put rather directly, funding to
support CFSP crisis-management operations remains limited,
whereas the Community has substantial funds at its disposal.
Again, to quote Patten, ‘The secretariats that worked for the
Council of Ministers and its High Representative for the CFSP
resented the Commission’s access to useful things like
money’.13 As we look to the future the funding issue is likely
to remain at the centre of the inter-pillar competence
question. The Commission’s Instrument for Stability (hence-
forth Stability Instrument) is intended to improve the EU’s
response to crises by streamlining the Community and CFSP
responses under the forthcoming Financial Perspective (2007-
13).14 The general thrust of the proposal has been welcomed
by the Council and the European Parliament, although it has
also met with charges that ‘the Instrument oversteps
Commission competences and would reduce parliamentary
oversight’.15 Dewaele and Gourlay lament that the
‘negotiations on this new financial instrument have not been
carried out in the spirit of inter-institutional solidarity, but
rather been reduced to legalistic arguments over the precise
delineation of institutional competences’.16
ECOWAS and SALW: a
landmark case?
In retrospect Small Arms
and Light Weapons (SALW)
was one of the more likely
areas for a clash between
the Community and CFSP.
The action brought by the
European Commission
against the Council of the
EU on 21 February 2005
has the potential to be a
landmark case, with profound implications for the Council
and the Commission.17
Before examining the case in more detail, a little
background on SALW is necessary in order to understand
why it has become a landmark case. The trade and spread
of SALW has been recognised internationally and affects
not only the security of civil populations but is also associated
with terrorism and organised crime. According to UN
estimates there are around 600 million light weapons in
global circulation, which are responsible for 500,000
deaths per annum, 300,000 of which occur in armed
conflicts. Of the 49 major conflicts in the 1990s, 47 were
conducted with SALW as the major weapons.18
EU issues relating to the production, transfer and
acquisition of armaments are generally a Member State
competence (Article 296 TEC). In spite of this, arms trafficking
was mentioned in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and eight
broad criteria were agreed that Member States should take
into account when licensing arms exports. A Programme
for Preventing and Combating the Illicit Trafficking in
Convention Arms was agreed to on 26 June 1997 which,
although internal in focus, had important external di-
mensions including various weapons buy-back, collection
and destruction schemes.19  The 1998 EU Code of Conduct
included ‘full scope’ sanctions (in other words, those
including military, arms and any other items).20 A resolution
on small arms the following year reinforced the Union’s
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though, is only partially
a legal matter.
The question of funding
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resolve to stem the spread of SALW, with a particular
emphasis on southern (SADC) and western (ECOWAS)
Africa.21 The agreements above have been complemented
by bilateral arrangements such as those with the United
States and Canada. Finally, the European Council adopted
a Strategy to combat the illicit trafficking of SALW and their
ammunition in December 2005 and, of relevance for the
case discussed below, the strategy noted that, ‘Africa
remains the continent most affected by the impact of
internal conflicts aggravated by the destabilising influx of
SALW’.22
The development of EU policy on SALW has had a slow
gestation. The emergence of the Schengen area focussed
attention on the issue since it implied that there was a need
for cooperation on a variety of efforts to counter organised
crime, terrorism and drug trafficking – all of which carried
external ramifications, including the SALW.23 The Member
States would clearly not give up their interest in SALW-
related issues, given national sensitivities in this area,
alongside the continued existence of Article 296 TEC.
However, the linkage with Community activities is also
irrefutable. A SALW pamphlet (published by the European
Commission) makes the
link clear:
Countries with high levels
of insecurity or violence
cannot make effective use
of development assis-
tance. Therefore, assis-
tance to conflict-prone
countries or regions
should be provided in
order to promote security,
disarmament and demo-
bilisation as well as
reintegration of ex-com-
batants into civil society,
as an integrated part of
social and economic
development program-
mes.24
In the case of ECOWAS specifically, the members declared
a moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of
SALW in November 1998 and, a year later, a code of
conduct. The Commission has indirectly supported the
moratorium for several years, especially through a € 1.9
million conflict-prevention project approved in 1999. Ironically
conflict prevention, which became a ‘fixed priority’ for the
Union in 2001, was to be another area subject to conflicting
competences and inter-institutional friction.
To return to the case, the Commission requested the
annulment of a Council decision of December 2004, ‘for
lack of competence’, regarding an EU contribution to
ECOWAS in the framework on the Moratorium on SALW.25
It is therefore now up to the Court of Justice to review the
legality of the Council decision.26  The Commission challenge
was mounted on the grounds that the Council was not
competent to adopt the decision referred to and that existing
legislation, in this case the Cotonou Agreement, covers inter
alia the spread of SALW.27 Article 11(3) of the Agreement
mentions, amongst other things, the need to address ‘the
excessive and uncontrolled spread, illegal trafficking and
accumulation of small arms and light weapons’. The Council
decision also allegedly violates Article 47 of the TEU which
states that, ... nothing in this Treaty shall affect the Treaties
establishing the European Community or the subsequent
Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them. Accor-
ding to the Commission’s challenge the Council’s Joint
Action also violated Articles 177 and 181a of the TEC. Under
these respective articles the Community is attributed
competence for development aid and, in particular, ‘within
its spheres of competence, economic, financial and technical
cooperation measures with third countries’. The Commission
also sought a declaration of illegality for a further Council
Joint Action from July 2002.28
From the Council perspective the Joint Actions referred
to above were consonant with Title V of the TEU which states
that, ‘The Union shall define and implement a common
foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and
security policy ...’ [Article 11.1]. The TEU also states that
CFSP shall ‘include all questions relating to the security of
the Union ... [Article 17.1 emphasis added]. However, the
Common Provisions of the TEU state that the Union shall be
‘founded on the European Communities, supplemented by
the policies and forms of cooperation established by this
Treaty’ [Article 1, emphasis added]. It should be noted that
the following article sets
out as one of the Union’s
objectives to ‘maintain in
full the acquis com-
munautaire and to build on
it with a view to considering
to what extent the policies
and forms of cooperation
introduced by this Treaty
may need to be revised
with the aim of ensuring
the effectiveness of the
mechanisms and the insti-
tutions of the Community’
[Article 2]. The two articles,
when read together, would
seem to imply that CFSP
(and, for that matter, the
third pillar) are subservient
to the Community in the sense that the development of the
second pillar must respect the acquis communautaire. The
presence of a ‘single institutional framework’, the need to
ensure the consistency of the Union’s external actions while
‘respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire’
[Article 3 TEU] and the precedence of Community law over
national law, all imply that there exists a Union acquis,
applying equally to the second and third pillars, in practice
if not name.29  It would be equally counter-intuitive to
assume that the existence of CFSP (and the third pillar) does
not modify the acquis communautaire and European law.
According to Pascal Gauttier the requirement for consistency,
a responsibility falling to the Council and the Commission,
‘each in accordance with its respective powers’ [Article 3
TEU], has led ‘both institutions to rightly claim competence
over all aspects of the Union’s external activities’.30
An attempt, by deduction, to ascertain the nature of ‘all
aspects of security’, which is of relevance to our discussions,
is also likely to end in frustration. If we look at the external
powers of the Community, these aspects are merely implied
from the internal Community tasks laid out in Article 2
(TEC). Aside from the legal niceties, the practical, everyday,
challenges of deciding where, for example, financial support
strays into security policy issues, or vice versa, is often
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against the Council of the
EU on 21 February 2005
has the potential to be
a landmark case,
with profound implications
for the Council and
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unclear. So, in addition to the legal ambiguities sur-
rounding this case, there is also the all important question
of the intentions and perceptions of the respective instruments
referred to above.
On the question of intentions, Bastien Nivet comments
that the ‘EU’s intervention in ECOWAS countries and its
support to ECOWAS in the field of SALWs had first developed
essentially as a financial support to local and UNDP-
operated existing programmes’.31 Thus, the Commission-
backed SALW efforts could legitimately be portrayed as a
matter of Community competence, based on the Cotonou
Agreement, since it was primarily financial in nature. The
Council, acting through CFSP, committed the EU to ‘offer
a financial contribution and technical assistance to set up
the Light Weapons Unit within the ECOWAS Technical
Secretariat and convert the Moratorium into a Convention
on small arms and light weapons between the ECOWAS
Member States’.32  The
Council therefore wish-
ed to establish direct
technical and financial
assistance to the ECO-
WAS Secretariat itself,
rather than the Com-
mission model which
was based on support
directed through exis-
ting programmes; as
Nivet comments, the
Council’s approach
‘implies a shift of co-
operative method’.33
The EU Strategy to
combat illicit accumu-
lation and trafficking of
SALW and their ammu-
nition, adopted by the
European Council after
the above-mentioned
legal challenge, conti-
nues to portray SALW
as primarily a CFSP
concern, even going so
far as to argue that,
‘generally speaking,
the whole range of
CFSP instruments can
be mobilised in support of Union SALW-related action
(Personal Representatives, Special Representatives, politi-
cal declarations, technical support, demarches and
structured dialogues, ad hoc seminars on export controls)’.34
The story is further complicated by the fact the Union’s
principal vehicles to stem SALW in Africa had been through
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
and SSR which it helps to finance through the European
Development Fund (EDF).35 The EU strategy refers to
‘development and assistance programmes financed by the
EDF, in the framework of EC-ACP cooperation’ as one of
the available external instruments.36 The advent of the
African Union (AU) in December 2002 at the Durban
Summit contained a strong security dimension; hence the
inclusion of a Peace and Security Council. At the AU Maputo
summit in 2003 the heads of state proposed that a peace
facility be set up using EC development co-operation
agreements directed at their respective countries. The EU
accordingly agreed in July 2003 to establish a EU Peace
Support Operation Facility for the AU financed from funds
allocated to them via existing development co-cooperation
agreements, matched initially by matching funding from
unallocated EDF resources.37
The AU Peace Facility (APF) is now worth some € 250
million and is managed by Africans. The overall purpose of
the Facility is to create the conditions for development since,
as is acknowledged by Solana in the European Security
Strategy and in the Cotonou Agreement, there can be no
development without security. From the Commission’s
perspective, ‘the decision to extend the use of development
funds to peace and security issues was therefore a deliberate
one’.38  The use of funding originally intended as Official
Development Assistance for peace support operations has
created controversy and, more generally, the support for
AU peacekeeping missions is a change from the normal
economic co-operation
that has typified the
Union’s role on the con-
tinent. Hence, to some
critics, it was seen as
‘inappropriate to use
development aid for
military-related expen-
ditures, which was the
case with the Africa
Peace Facility even if
they are not considered
directly “military” ope-
rations’.39
The APF carries the
seeds for further con-
fusion regarding the
roles of the Community
and the second pillar.
Although the APF has
been presented prima-
rily as a vehicle for de-
velopment, which ne-
cessitates an active
Community role, the
political implications of
supporting sensitive
peace keeping opera-
tions points to an active
CFSP role (especially
that of the Political and Security Committee).
Formal and informal approaches to competence
issues
One of the first solutions, or perhaps a form of short-term
‘non-solution’, is simply to step back and let the situation
evolve, with the Court’s decision on the ECOWAS/SALW
case as an integral part of this evolution. Indeed, it could
be argued that different interpretations of competences are
part of everyday life – in national administration, the work
place and even the home – and the situation will gradually
right itself. Whilst there is some merit to the argument, it can
be challenged on the grounds that there may be a very real
human cost in terms of the Union’s ability to be an effective
international actor, if the problems outlined above are not
addressed.
A more formal approach, interrupted by the two ‘No’
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votes in the 2005 referendums, was to address the compe-
tence issues through the Constitutional Treaty. The Laeken
Declaration on the Future of the EU had identified the need
for a redefined division of competence while, at the same
time, guarding against ‘creeping expansion of the com-
petence of the Union or to encroachment upon the exclusive
areas of competence of the Member States …’.40 The
Constitutional Treaty did little to solve the issue of com-
petences since the procedures, instruments and institutions
remain much as they are currently. The innovations in the
external relations area, such as the Union Minister for
Foreign Affairs or the European External Action Service,
may hold the potential to alter the institutional balance of
powers, but they will also become part and parcel of the
competences struggle and most likely its focus.
In the absence of a Constitutional Treaty, other forms of
ad hoc cooperation in the ‘grey areas’ could be fostered.
There are already examples of close cooperation in, for
example, the current missions to Aceh and the Moldova-
Ukraine border monitoring mission. Another interesting
example is the joint appointment of Erwan Fouéré as Head
of the European Commission delegation to the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as EU Special
Representative – thus avoiding the sometimes awkward
relations between the Special Representative and the heads
of the Commission delegations. More de facto collaboration
has arisen in the External Service as well, since the boundaries
of what is communautaire and what is intergovernmental
have become more blurred, aided and abetted by the lack
of Council Secretariat representation overseas outside of
liaison offices in Geneva and New York (separate from
those of the Commission).
The Commission has also realised the need for occasional
specialist advice in the ‘grey’ areas, exemplified by the
temporary assignment of a military advisor from the EU
Military Staff to give advice on the Darfur region. The
relatively new European Defence Agency has revived the
Community’s interest in the defence-industrial aspects,
especially through DG Enterprise who strongly backs the
objective of creating a strong and competitive European
defence industry supported by cooperative research and
development. In spite of these encouraging signs, the
question remains as to whether they are ad hoc or part of
a broader emerging understanding on competences.
Conclusion
There is no simple solution to the complex issues raised
above. The Constitutional Treaty, if adopted, would still
leave many questions of competence in the air and may
well exacerbate existing tensions. At the practical level there
are a few examples of pragmatic solutions which involve
the recognition of common aims but which also, in many
cases, reflect the existence of limited resources. It is therefore
possible that a slow neo-functionalist approach may clarify
some of the competence issues in a bottom-up manner.
Such a process could also be complemented by top-down
effects, such as judgements of the Court of Justice. It should
nevertheless be noted that the general non-applicability of
the Court’s jurisdiction in the CFSP area, alongside the
ability to conclude international agreements to implement
CFSP, may lead to further disputes in the numerous ‘grey
areas’ identified above.
One of the best hopes for diminishing inter-institutional
tension in the grey areas may stem from the Constitutional
Treaty itself, in the form of the European External Action
Service. In spite of the fact that the Service is intimately tied
to the existence of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, there
may be some logic to reviving the talks between the Council
and the Commission on the Service. Although this could
easily lead to charges of ‘cherry picking’ (and the Service
is often mentioned as a potential target), it is the process of
talking through the design of the Service that is almost as
important as any outcome. The discussions on the Service
will inevitably be very sensitive since they go the very heart
of the competence issue, but they are also long overdue.
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